Abstract: Turkish electricity reform is entering a new phase through the Turkish Government's proposal to create 21 new distribution companies, 18 of them through merger. Two aspects of merger analysis are the operational cost savings and the potential production efficiency gains. This paper concentrates on the second aspect and uses a recently developed methodology to assess the potential effect of these mergers and whether these mergers are efficiency enhancing. This is performed by comparing the actual efficiency levels of observed distribution companies with the merger of proposed aggregated companies. The model is calibrated on panel data from 1999 to 2003 which include measures of physical capital and labour inputs, as well as customer and energy related outputs. The results indicate potential for considerable efficiency gains from the proposed mergers.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, many countries with different economic, social and political endowments, and a variety of institutional and legal capabilities and capacities have introduced reform measures to disaggregate and liberate their electricity markets (Al-Sunaidy and Green, 2006; Jamasb, Mota, Newbery and Pollitt, 2004) . Amongst the reforming countries, Turkey is of special interest for two reasons. Firstly, although Turkey started the reform as early as 1984, the pace of the reform process has been very slow. Secondly, while most countries have been trying to introduce private ownership into their electricity sector, recently Turkey has moved in the opposite direction by nationalising three of her four private distribution In this paper we apply a recently developed methodology by Bogetoft and Wang (2005) to investigate whether these proposed mergers in the Turkish electricity distribution sector promise potential efficiency enhancement. Bogetoft and Wang's 1 The provinces served by the previously privately operated electricity distributors are IstanbulAnatolian part (Aktas), Mersin, Adana, and Hatay (Cukurova) and Antalya (Kepez). Kayseri Electricity Company serves the Kayseri province. 2 In a previous study by Bagdadioglu, Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) these companies were identified as good examples of management relative to their publicly owned counterparts, and their nationalisation therefore raises questions about the real reasons for their apparently good earlier performance.
(2005) model is for non-parametric measurement of the potential gains from mergers, and we use it to compare two different comparative static equilibria: the existing organisational structure of electricity services and the planned merged structure, in which the technical efficiency with which observed inputs are transformed to outputs is evaluated relative to the existing structure. Related ideas have been discussed by Arocena (2005) .
We describe a merger as advantageous if the merged producers could operate with greater technical efficiency than do the existing producers. The model identifies the scope for technical efficiency improvement through mergers, but to realize this potential some associated incentive mechanism is required. Our analysis does not provide a complete cost-benefit analysis of the proposed mergers, since we do not calculate the transaction or adjustment costs of the mergers, nor do we compute the discounted present value of the net efficiency gains. Because our concentration is on technical efficiency, neither do we address the allocative question of the possible creation of market power through the mergers. In any case, since each distribution company holds a local monopoly, such issues of market power are mainly relevant for providing comparative data to the regulator. In these senses our approach is different from the related studies in the empirical literature focusing on the organisational dimensions of electricity distribution using parametric measurement, as reviewed by Kwoka (2005) .
The paper is organised in five main sections. Section 2 describes the Turkish electricity reform programme, focusing on the distribution sector in which we evaluate the progress so far. Section 3 outlines the model and our interpretation of the non-parametric measurements. We review two aspects of the analytical basis: the first is the description of the production set that characterises the technology that we wish to discuss; the second is the measurement of potential efficiency gains from mergers.
Section 4 presents the data and the results. Section 5 discusses the results and explores the likely incentive mechanism under private ownership and regulation, which could create an environment to realise the potential gains which we identify. A comprehensive plan for the industry and its reform can be found elsewhere, for instance in Erdogdu (2006) , Ozkivrak (2005) , and Hepbasli (2005) . In this section we focus on the distribution part of the Turkish reform programmes. The ESRPSP
anticipates that the distribution facilities will be privatised first, following a major restructuring of TEDAS. This is not the first attempt to privatise distribution facilities, and the choice of commencing the privatisation process with TEDAS in the Turkish electricity sector is not arbitrary. Turkey's priority has always been to increase generation capacity to meet the growing demand. This caused disproportionate investment in generation plants to the detriment of distribution networks. Consequently consecutive governments could not meet urgently needed distribution network renewal and maintenance investments from the central budget.
The obvious alternative was to seek private investment resulting in the first serious attempt to privatise TEDAS in 1993, when it was separated from TEA.
However, private investors insisted on international arbitration for dispute resolution which the legal framework could not accommodate at that time, delaying privatisation until Parliament amended the Constitution to permit such arbitration in 1999. During this time the Government continued to underinvest in the distribution network, so that the network losses (both technical and non-technical) reached alarming levels throughout the country, on average over 25% during 1999-2003, as shown in table 2 . 5 In 2004, the total electricity generation and consumption was reported to reach 149.8 Twh and 149.2 Twh respectively. The major energy sources used for electricity generation were thermal (69.2%), hydroelectric (30.7%), and wind (0.1%). 1.1 Twh of electricity was exported to Iraq, while 463 Gwh of electricity was imported from Turkmenistan. The electricity load fluctuated during the year between 23,485 MW (maximum demand) and 12,485 MW (minimum demand). 47.4% of generation is from local resources (EMRA, 2004) . 6 In terms of promoting competition, this transitory period is already handicapped by the presence of private companies operating under the schemes of Build-Operate (BO), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), and Transfer of Operating Rights (TOR) with a take-or-pay clause, which is likely to restrict competition emerging in the generation sector in the near future. Auto-producers, which may generate electricity for their own need, are also exploiting opportunities provided by the transitory period. They have recently been detected behaving strategically under the balancing and settlement regime, by decreasing their production to buy cheaper electricity at the low tariff period, while meeting their demand from their own plants during the high tariff period (EMRA, 2006) . 
Merger Area
The provinces included in the distribution region According to the ESRPSP, the merger areas were determined with reference to the operational problems arising from geographical structure, the size of regions in terms of energy purchases, the technical and financial characteristics of the distribution organisations and the existing contracts. We do not know of any published document justifying or challenging the creation of these merged companies; a short unpublished document indicates that they were chosen to achieve cost minimisation and synergies, and to create an attractive market environment for international investors.
Our paper aims to fill this gap in explicit analysis by providing empirically based evidence of potential efficiency gains from these proposed mergers. The following section describes how we use the data envelopment methodology and measure the potential efficiency gains from these proposed mergers in the Turkish electricity distribution sector.
THE DEA MODEL OF THE GAINS FROM MERGERS OF PRODUCTION UNITS
The analysis of merger potential exploits the concept of sub-additivity of the cost function, and we begin by setting out the assumptions about the relevant technology.
Outputs and inputs are real, non-negative values of vectors of non-random numbers, x and y, respectively. We define a production set describing how l outputs,
From this we can define an equivalent representation of the technology, the input requirement set ( )
We shall assume throughout the paper that these representations of the technology have the properties of convexity and free disposability. 
and if
Moreover, Bogetoft and Wang also assume J-additivity, which states that the above property is assumed to hold for any subset containing J of the n observations in the piecewise linear representation of the production set T. The essential point is that any merger is technically feasible even if not beneficial and that a merged utility can be operated as two independent divisions. Examination of the data on electricity distribution utilities in many European countries and elsewhere indicates that utilities that are smaller and larger than those in the Turkish sample are technically feasible.
In particular, in the UK five of the current 14 electricity distribution utilities operate as independent divisions of merged firms. Consequently, we argue that the additivity and J-additivity assumptions are relatively innocuous. In particular they do not assume that mergers are beneficial, which is the empirical focus of the paper.
Given a set of exogenous input prices, w, the cost function of a producer is:
A merger of J producers (from amongst a total of N producers) is potentially advantageous if the cost function is sub-additive:
This result, [4] , states that the cost of manufacturing the sum of the merged outputs is less than or equal to the aggregate cost of producing the individual outputs. For given input prices, common to all producers, the sub-additivity result in [4] implies and is implied by super-additivity of the input requirements set, i.e. that the aggregate input requirements of the producers before the merger form a subset of the input requirements of the merged group.
( )
Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994, 263-9) demonstrate the duality analysis of mergers as shown in figure 2. . Cost sub-additivity will (weakly) justify a merger if the merged cost is not more than the aggregate individual costs. Formally, we write:
This is illustrated in figure 2 where the merged cost is represented by the isocost line passing through the point:
, and tangential to the isoquant boundary of the merged input requirements set: ( ) figure 2 we can see
aggregate cost merged cost that cost-subadditivity is therefore equivalent by duality to super-additivity of the input requirements sets:
This follows because the aggregated input requirement to produce at the minimum cost along ( ) ( ) without requiring input price data. We are assuming in effect that all the service providers face the same input prices at any given time. This assumption is realistic for the 81 publicly owned Turkish electricity distribution companies, whose inputs are obtained by law through a common, publicly operated procurement policy.
We investigate a merger as a collection of firms for which the inputs and outputs have been combined. Assume that J of the N firms are merged, and arbitrarily re-labelled
within the merged group. A merged group, i.e. what Färe et al (1994) call an out-of-sample or hypothetical firm, has the inputs and outputs:
The objective is to compute measures of Overall Merger Efficiency, J E , and to decompose this into constituent components. First, we calculate an input-orientated radial measure of overall merger efficiency, E J , to evaluate the relative efficiency of a proposed merger of J producers, subject to constraints which define a piecewise linear representation of the input requirements set. A piecewise linear representation of the input requirements set is based on observations of the input and output vectors of the N producers, collected in the matrices: X and Y, and a set of non-negative intensity weights, :
Subsequently we make use of the vectors: 
This suggests the merger is advantageous if 1 < J E , i.e. the merged group could produce the same aggregate outputs with less input usage, and it is disadvantageous
The key to understanding the model's results is that we measure only the potential for efficiency gains. To achieve the gains which the model demonstrates are possible, appropriate incentive mechanisms would need to be in place. The model does not guarantee that the gains will necessarily be achieved by the indicated merger. It states only that there is a potential gain to the merger arising from the measured inefficiency of the aggregated producers. If no such inefficiency exists either because the producers are already efficient, or because the merged group is infeasibly large for the reference technology, then the merger is not advantageous. If inefficiency of the feasible merged group is observed, relative to the chosen reference technology, then the merger may be beneficial if it can be accompanied by incentives designed to drive out the inefficiencies. In the absence of the relevant incentives, the merger will probably fail to achieve its potential. The test embodied in the model tells the investigator whether there could be a positive return to better incentive design within a merged group of producers.
The specification of returns to scale of the reference technology is important in the evaluation of the merger possibilities because by definition a merged group of producers is a rescaling of the individual producers in the group. A variety of cases is possible for the piecewise linear representation of the input requirements set depending on the properties of the intensity weights. The three which will be of interest in this input orientation are constant, variable and non-increasing returns to scale, respectively: crs, vrs, and nirs. However for a vrs reference technology, these conditions may not hold and it is possible that there will be no feasible solution to the linear programme defined by [11] . That would not of course imply that the merger itself was infeasible in a practical sense. Infeasibility of the non-parametric programme [11] would signify that the merged output vector was too large to be feasible relative to the chosen reference technology, or that the merged inputs vector could not be made available by combining the observed inputs in a feasible way, i.e. by non-negative intensity weights which summed to unity.
The concept of scale effects used here is related to the properties of the production set.
This contrasts with the specification of the production function in an econometric approach -indeed there is no assumption that a parametrically specified production or transformation function exists. The production set may exhibit properties of crs or vrs, more specifically nirs or non-decreasing returns to scale (ndrs) for different ranges of the sample of observations. In moving from a low-scale firm to a high-scale firm the efficient frontier that envelopes the firms may expand more than proportionately (ndrs), proportionately (crs) or less than proportionately (nirs). If all the expansion possibilities are proportional then the technology exhibits crs, while if the expansion possibility becomes limited at high scale levels, then the reference technology exhibits nirs and some mergers may be infeasible. Since the specification of a crs or vrs technology is open to the researcher, both possibilities can be measured, allowing for mergers which are feasible under one specification but may not be feasible under the other. This contrasts with the econometric approach where the wrong specification leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters. By carrying out a test of the distribution functions of the efficiency scores, the researcher can infer which assumption is valid for the sample under consideration.
In this paper we are investigating a set of planned mergers comprising a wide range of different service producers. Consequently we can think of the range of potential mergers as comprising a blue-print for the organisational structure of the industry. In principle any subset of the potential mergers may be evaluated as a potential candidate
The individual technical efficiency effect adjusts the merged inputs for potential efficiency gains within the group as each member is given incentives to reach the frontier for the group. Within the merged group, therefore, the relative efficiency of each of the merging firms could be computed with reference to the rest of the group by the data envelopment analysis model. For example in the vrs case, we have:
In principle this model could be computed under any of the returns to scale assumptions, but no issue of programme infeasibility arises since each of the right hand side inputs and outputs is already an observed member of the set merged inputs and outputs.
Applying this in turn to each of the merged firms in the group suggests how the inputs could be adjusted as part of the merger to bring each firm up to the frontier of the group by multiplying the inputs by the relative input efficiencies,
This in turn provides a new set of merged group inputs after the efficiency adjustment:
In this paper we compute this model for each of the three returns to scale assumptions, but in presenting the results we concentrate on the vrs case shown in [13] . Our argument is that, unlike the situation when we are contemplating the range of potential mergers which is analogous to a long-run blueprint for the industry, within each actual merger there will be short-run difficulties and adjustments in forging a united group. The preferences and customs of the individual agents amongst other factors will add to this difficulty, and consequently it is more appropriate to adopt a less flexible reference technology when computing the within merger efficiencyadjusted inputs. Using these within merger efficiency-adjusted inputs, we re-compute the overall merger efficiency model:
The second component of the decomposition identified by Bogetoft and Wang (2005) is an economies of scope effect. However this does not arise from the merger of 
Applying programmes [15] and [17] to the merged groups has adjusted the overall merger efficiency for both individual technical efficiency effects within the merged group, and for efficiency improvements that would arise if the mean input-output basket of the merged producers was available as an out-of-sample observation.
We have isolated two effects that account for technical efficiency and scope efficiency gains from a merger. Bogetoft and Wang (2005) Consequently, we can identify positive multiplier weights with input and output dimensions in which each distribution service is fully constrained, and therefore we can identify the absent inputs and outputs as ones where there are positive slacks.
As shown above the Bogetoft and Wang model provides a useful identification of the presence and extent of potential efficiency gains from mergers, which could be used in a merger review by a competition -or any other regulatory -authority. In the following section we apply this model to identify the presence and extent of such gains in the proposed mergers from Turkish electricity distribution.
DATA AND RESULTS
The data we use comprise a panel of annual data from 1999-2003 of 82 electricity distribution utilities in Turkey. The source of the data is the MENR. The variables used and their descriptive statistics are shown in table 2: We designate output variables as y r , and input variables as x i . All of the variables are measured in levels because ratios of variables may raise interpretative issues for the question of returns to scale. We adopt an input orientation because we recognise that utilities will be constrained to minimise input usage subject to meeting exogenous output targets. The outputs are customer service, which is proxied by the numbers of customers served by each distribution utility, and electricity distributed. Service area in the case of these utilities is an exogenous variable. However it can be regarded in this context also as a non-discretionary output since it represents an additional target for service level coverage. In the input orientation used here, therefore, service area will appear as indistinguishable from the other outputs rather than as an output that can be priced in an economically meaningful sense (Neuberg, 1977) . The capital infrastructure to supply this range of services consists of transformers and network length, and this is supplemented by labour input. In reinforcing a network, electricity losses will rise as service area expands unless additional physical capital is used.
Consequently, we are able to use electrical losses as another form of input to proxy the direct capital requirements of improving the quality of the network. The model is similar in concept to Bagdadioglu, Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) .
In computing the linear programmes we expressed all data in mean corrected form While the full model described above is used in the efficiency calculations for this paper, it is important to consider other specifications 9 . Standard variables for the outputs are numbers of customers and electricity delivered to reflect the customer service and energy consumption objectives of the utilities (Estache, Rossi, and Ruzzier, 2002, and Pollitt, 2001) . However, on the output side, the full model also includes service area as an output variable to reflect the difficulty of 8 All of the linear programmes for the data envelopment analysis and the merger evaluations were written in GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) software. 9 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for reminding us of this.
meeting customer services over a less densely populated area. As the table of descriptive statistics shows, service areas vary markedly from 840 km 2 to over 38,000 km 2 . This specification is tested using a non-parametric K-S test applied to the constant returns to scale specification with the full vector of inputs 10 This tells us that while the utilities will always show higher efficiency scores when service area is included, the efficiency scores are not different at the 5 per cent level of significance. It could be argued therefore that whether service area is included or not will not affect the distribution of efficiency scores. We would get lower but not significantly different efficiency scores by excluding the service area, but at the expense of penalising utilities with large service areas by suggesting that they are less efficient than the case when service area is included. This would have the effect of suggesting that there are greater potential efficiency gains to mergers of utilities serving large areas than is the case when service area is included. This could impact strongly on the analysis of mergers, so it becomes a matter of judgement about which model to prefer. It can be argued that service area should be included if the utilities' efficiency scores are to be shown in the best light before the merger calculations.
This prompts us to keep service area in the model in order not to over-estimate the potential gains from mergers of utilities which already serve geographically large areas.
On the input side, number of employees, transformer capacity and network length are standard inputs used in virtually all regulatory jurisdictions (Estache, Rossi, and Ruzzier, 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001) . The analysis includes the number of transformers, and also the level of electricity losses as a measure of input requirements for line reinforcement. We tested the specification of the input vectors as: (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 ) against (x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 ), (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ,), and (x 1 , x 3 , x 4 ,). In all cases the K-S p-values (0.71, 0.98, and 0.25 respectively) fail to reject the null that the efficiency score distribution functions are equal. Consequently, by using the full 10 Cumulative distribution functions of both the log of efficiency as suggested by Banker and Natarajan (2004) , and the level of efficiency are used; the results are identical in all of the K-S tests.
vector of outputs, we are able to show the pre-merger utilities in the best light, without using a specification which yields efficiency scores that differ significantly from any of the other competing specifications that were considered. In summary, at the 5 per cent level of significance, the efficiency scores are not sensitive to output and input specifications that differ from the full model used in the remainder of the paper.
In table 3, we report the DEA efficiency scores for each of the 82 distribution utilities under the crs assumption. We also identify the efficient peers for each of the utilities.
The brackets in the first column show for how many inefficient distributors each efficient distributor is the reference organisation. Table 3 Jones (1996) and are likely to reflect a less peaky demand, since industrial demand is less seasonally variable than residential load. The Anatolian part of Istanbul used to be served by the private operator Aktas until it was nationalised in 2002. The top score suggests that its efficient performance was not adversely affected in 2003 by nationalisation. In contrast, Kayseri, the only distribution utility privately run throughout the period, presents a poor performance with a relatively low average efficiency score, an interesting finding since its efficiency is measured relative to stateowned utilities where agency problem may be more severe.
In interpreting the details of table 3 our main interest is in those inputs within the control of the distribution organisations where slack is indicated, since organisations are generally faced with a given number of consumers and demand level and service levels are exogenously determined.
Similarly the length of the network may also be out of the organisations' control. Amongst the other input variables we note most incidence of slack in the number of transformers. 50 of the 82 organisations have slack in this column, suggesting that they have more transformers than "necessary" for their output levels, relative to best practice. 42 organisations have slack in transformer capacity, suggesting that they could produce the same output with lower capacity. 24
have slack in both transformer related inputs. Other studies reported by Yatchew indicate a similar result that economies of scale are exhausted at the relatively low level of around 20,000 customers and levels of electricity delivered of 500-3500
GWh. In the sample used in this paper, the technology is modelled directly rather than through cost performance, so that the appropriate concern is with returns to scale in a multiple output framework.
In 2003, the average number of customers for the 82 utilities reaches 325,000 and the average annual load delivered is over 1000GWh. Consequently these utilities are of a size for which returns to scale would be exhausted in the findings reported by Yatchew. We used a non-parametric K-S test of the null hypothesis of equality of efficiency distribution functions under constant and variable returns to scale for the pooled sample, as suggested by Banker and Natarajan (2004) . The K-S p-value for the null is 0.254 so that the null hypothesis of equality of the efficiency distribution functions is not rejected at the 5 or even 10 per cent level of significance. It is clear therefore that returns to scale have been exhausted by the typical utility in the sample, consistent with the findings from the econometric literature. This reinforces the specification of constant returns to scale as the benchmark for the merger efficiency comparisons.
Our results show the possibility of considerable efficiency improvement within the Turkish electricity distribution sector. One way of accomplishing such improvement is by encouraging the inefficient distributors to imitate their efficient peers. An alternative way is to merge distribution organisations to eliminate inefficiency, as proposed by the Turkish Government.
We now compute the potential efficiency gains for the proposed mergers. We have identified the harmony effects as the major source of potential efficiency gains, and it is possible to achieve these without full merger as Bogetoft and Wang (2005) suggest. Since the critical aspect of the harmony gains relates, in this sample, to the elimination of slack in input usage, it is possible that an internal market mechanism, or joint ventures short of full merger, could achieve better use of available input services. shows that the geographical constraints of including adjacent organisations in each merger do indeed limit the potential gains available. 
DISCUSSION, INCENTIVES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our purpose in the paper is to measure strong efficiency gains empirically, and therefore the ranking of the magnitude of the effect (1 -E J ) is the primary concern. However, these effects are sensitive to the assumptions about the technology and further research is needed to relax maintained assumptions such as Convexity.
Our analysis opted to limit the range of scale effects within the merged group, but use of weightrestricted DEA may be an area for further research on the limits on scope or harmony effects as well. Finally, robustness of the results is critical. Our use of pooled data is one simple way to address the issue but an alternative would be to adopt a bootstrapping approach to handle sampling error.
As explained above, the model does not guarantee that the potential gains will be achieved by the indicated mergers. It identifies only a possible gain from the mergers, arising from the measured inefficiency of the aggregated merging distributors. For the potential efficiency enhancement at either individual level or at merged level to be realised, an appropriate incentive mechanism is necessary. Incentives for all of the companies would be expected to change significantly with the reform process. Some change may occur with 'corporatisation' as the entities are prepared for privatisation, and different accountability measures are introduced. However the main effect on incentives is anticipated with change of ownership, when shareholders would want to minimise costs for a given output level (of consumers and quantity of electricity distributed, as well as service quality). If there is an effective mechanism to align managers' incentives with those of shareholders, this should lead to a drive to reduce costs (and therefore inputs) across the industry.
The shareholders' wish to maximise profit would also carry incentives to raise prices, given that each organisation will hold a monopoly in electricity distribution in its relevant area to capture economies of density and avoid wasteful duplication of the network system. The privatised companies will therefore be subject to economic regulation to prevent monopoly exploitation of their consumers, and limit the prices they can charge; the Turkish government has announced that such regulation will be cost based. This raises problems of asymmetric information, since it is difficult for the regulator to identify an efficient level of costs for each privatised company, and to distinguish between costs that are under the companies' control and those that are not. If the regulator cannot overcome this asymmetric information challenge, the incentives to reduce costs will be weakened and companies may be able to continue inefficient practices and pass the (inefficient) costs on to consumers through higher prices which are allowed by the regulator.
However the DEA analysis described in this paper can also be used as a tool by the regulator to identify whether or not the costs incurred by any one organisation are efficient, through comparison with others in the sector.
In general, the more companies are available for such comparison, the better informed the regulator can become, so the mergers might be seen as weakening a potential regulatory tool. On the other hand, since the mergers result in potentially more efficient companies, the relevance of any one to the regulator in determining the least cost possibilities may be greater. In any case, 21 comparators is a reasonably large number in such circumstances. (The British energy regulator has used comparisons with only 14 distribution companies).
The value of such comparison would be reduced if the cost observations are not truly independent of each other. This might arise if there were collusion between the companies, or if several were owned by the same company. In practice it may be difficult for the Turkish government to find twenty-one fully independent owners for its electricity distribution companies, particularly if it is selling them to foreign owners, where a relatively small number of large companies dominate such international markets. So the government may face a choice between maximising sales proceeds from the flotation and providing the maximum number of independent observations to facilitate the regulator's task after privatisation.
Our analysis examines only the benefits which could be reaped relative to current 'best practice'.
Other sources of increased efficiency may arise from the reform process itself. For example it may be possible to acquire inputs more cheaply, or to reduce the general level of staffing in the industry.
Private companies will have incentives to explore both these possibilities. If employees are made redundant, it may be appropriate to compensate them in some way, perhaps from the privatisation proceeds which will anticipate the higher profits achievable from such measures.
In conclusion, our analysis has suggested that these mergers can be justified by their potential to provide substantial efficiency gains (an average reduction of inputs of 16%). These benefits could have been achieved through other methods of spreading best practice, but given the ambition to privatise the companies, merger can provide both the potential for improved efficiency and more attractively sized units to offer to the market. The change of ownership is likely to generate efficiency gains through the profit motive, but market power will need to be curbed through regulation which itself can benefit from the comparative analysis methodology presented here.
